Schedule

Below is listed the dates, meeting places, times, and titles for all talks taking place. You can click on the title listed to view the accompanying abstract below.

March 21 Ohio Union Senate Chamber
9:30-10:00 Registration and Coffee
10:00-12:00 Paul Elbourne: 'Pronominalization as NP-deletion'
commentator: William Taschek
12:00-1:30 Lunch
1:30-3:30 Jeff King: 'Supplementives, the coordination account and conflicting intentions'
3:30-4:00 Coffee Break
4:00-6:00 John Hawthorne:

March 22 Ohio Union Round Meeting Room
9:00-9:30 Registration and Coffee
9:30-11:30 Hans Kamp: 'Deictic Demonstratives in Face-to-Face Communication'
commentator: Barbara Abbott
11:30-1:00 Lunch
1:00-3:00 Craige Roberts: 'Demonstratives as Indexicals'
commentator: Irene Heim
3:00-3:30 Coffee Break
3:30-5:30 Robin Jeshion: 'The Uniformity and Syntactic Arguments for Predicativism about Proper Names'
commentator: Michael Glanzberg
Craige Roberts

**Title:** Demonstratives as Indexicals

**Abstract:** In this paper I argue for a theory of demonstratives in which:

(a) they’re anaphoric (as I argued in Roberts 2002) and in that respect are definites like definite descriptions and pronouns,

but:

(b) they’re unlike the other definites in that they really are essentially indexical, something that isn’t adequately captured by King (2001), Roberts (2002), or Elbourne (2008),

and that:

(c) we can improve on the account of their indexicality in Kaplan (1977), as criticized by Heim 1985, by adopting a view of indexicals built on foundations drawn from Aloni (2001) and Stalnaker (2008).

From Aloni, I adopt the use of her conceptual covers. Intuitively these are contextually given conceptual perspectives that offer a variety of modes of individuation of the elements of the domain of a model; technically, a conceptual cover is a certain type of set of individual concepts. Aloni uses conceptual covers to develop a way of modeling de re identity under belief which offers solutions to several long-standing problems. Effectively, the conceptual cover with respect to which an embedded NP is interpreted may be distinct from that which characterizes it according to the interlocutors. For example, under a given conceptual cover, the interpretation of a proper name needn’t be a rigid individual concept.

From Lewis (1979) and Stalnaker, I borrow the notion of a center, modeled in a way that is sympathetic with Stalnaker’s modification of Lewis’ centered worlds. Centers are used to characterize the notion of a doxastic point of view. Like Stalnaker, in unembedded contexts the center is linked to the speaker, and thence to her doxastic state, which is taken to be consistent with the interlocutors’ pseudo-doxastic Common Ground. But unlike Lewis and Stalnaker, centers on this account are not primarily first elements in centered worlds (which have no direct role, as such, in interpretation), but are instead distinguished elements of the interlocutors’ contextual information. And a center is not an individual (type e), but an individual concept (type se), an element in a contextually salient conceptual cover. To capture the sense in which such an individual concept may play the role of the speaker in a discourse, for all worlds in the Context Set the value of the principal center is the speaker. This center serves as the origin (in the Cartesian sense) to which the index (Nunberg 1993, Elbourne) of an indexical is always anchored (except in Indirect Free Style, for certain indexicals, when the origin is shifted to the fictional center adopted by the narrator). In subordinate doxastic contexts—under the scope of epistemic modals or attitude predicates—there may be a subordinate center, distinct from that corresponding to the speaker, whose value in the worlds in the Context Set is the agent of the attitude (with suitable adjustments for iterated attitudes). Such a center influences the guise under which de re NPs in the modal’s scope may be understood, tying it to the retrieval of a conceptual cover appropriate to the agent. Such a doxastic shift is applicable in, and may have a truth conditionally evident effect on the interpretation of all definite NPs, including embedded indexicals like I or this. Hence, on this account, because of the way that conceptual covers can shift interpretation, the understood interpretations of
indexicals in subordinate doxastic contexts needn’t be rigid, although it is always anchored (in the worlds in the Context Set) to the res (speaker, demonstratum) given by the Common Ground.

References:
Lewis, David (1979b) Attitudes *de dicto* and *de se*. *The Philosophical Review* 88.4:513-543.

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Jeff King

title: Supplementives, the coordination account and conflicting intentions

abstract: Contextually sensitive expressions like ‘I’, whose meaning alone suffices for it to have a semantic value in context, are the exception when it comes to contextual sensitivity. Much more common seem to be expressions or constructions whose meanings must be supplemented in some way in context to have semantic values. I call such expressions supplementives to highlight their need for the supplementation in question. In addition to demonstrative expressions, it is arguable that modals, relational expressions (‘Annie’s book’), expressions that take implicit arguments (‘ready’), gradable adjectives and so on are supplementives in my sense. The question arises as to what is the nature of the supplementation required by supplementives in order that they have semantic values in context; and whether all supplementives require the same mechanism—supplementation of the same nature—to have semantic values in context. Following Glanzberg [2013], let’s say that in specifying the mechanism by means of which a supplementive has a semantic value in context one is giving the metasemantics for the supplementive in question. In King [2013a], I defended a certain metasemantics for demonstrative expressions and hypothesized that it was the proper metasemantics for all supplementives. In King [2013b], I gave a partial defense of this latter claim. In the present work I return to the case of demonstrative expressions and consider the more detailed and sophisticated version of my metasemantics that I have settled on since writing King [2013a, 2013b]. I want to show how the view teases apart various interesting cases that it appears should be teased apart. This will help explain and motivate certain features of the view. I then want to turn to some cases involving what I will call, perhaps slightly misleadingly, conflicting intentions. I’ll sketch two versions of my metasemantics that handle cases of conflicting intentions differently.

References:


King, Jeffrey C., 2013a, ‘Speaker Intentions in Context’, forthcoming in Nous


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Paul Elbourne

title: Pronominalization as NP-deletion

abstract: This paper explores the hypothesis that a wide variety of uses of pronouns, including reference, bound variable anaphora and donkey anaphora, should be thought of as relying on NP-deletion following a pronoun, with pronouns themselves interpreted as definite articles. This conception makes the syntax and semantics of pronouns rather similar to that assumed by those framing the traditional pronominalization transformation of 1960s transformational grammar.

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**Hans Kamp**

**title:** Deictic Demonstratives in Face-to-Face Communication

**abstract:** The core of this paper is an excerpt from a larger project aimed at gaining insight into the meaning and use of the definite noun phrases of English (and, eventually, of other languages). This project emphasizes the roles that different types of expressions play in verbal communication. The interpretation and production of an expression are studied in conjunction: the grammar of the language tells the recipient how to interpret expressions of a given type and the speaker will choose the expressions that make up her utterance with an eye on the ability of her addressee to interpret the expressions she chooses in the way she wants. In order to make analyses along these general lines precise we need: (i) an articulation of the interpretation rules for the expressions whose use and meaning is being analyzed; (ii) a general account of the resources that the rules of the language permit interpreters to make use of when interpreting expressions of different kinds; (iii) assumptions about the form in which this information is available to speakers of the language, and more generally of the forms of symbolic information representation in the human mind.

In the first part of the talk I will present those parts of the general project that are needed for what I want to say about the meaning and deictic use of demonstratives. The second part of the talk will be devoted specifically to demonstratives -- mostly to their deictic, but, in a subsidiary mode, also to some aspects of their anaphoric use. An emphasis of that discussion will be on the power that deictically used demonstratives have of creating the addressee's familiarity with their referents, which can then be exploited in their interpretation as definites, along roughly the same lines as we find for other types of definite noun phrases (such as proper names).

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Robin Jeshion

title: The Uniformity and Syntactic Arguments for Predicativism about Proper Names

abstract: I will discuss and attempt to dismantle the two central arguments for Predicativism about Proper Names, The Uniformity Argument (advanced by Burge, Elbourne, Fara, and others) and the Syntactic Argument (advanced by Sloat, Elbourne, Fara, Matushansky).